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I. INTRODUCTION
As a result of recent Supreme Court decisions, municipalities'
have been faced with an increasing number of antitrust suits. Along
with these suits comes the danger of massive liability in the form of
treble damages, years of litigation, expensive attorney's fees for de-
fense of such suits, 2 and uncertainty as to what actions will subject
the municipality to antitrust liability. In one municipal antitrust
case the plaintiffs sought treble damages in excess of $540,000,000;1
if divided among the residents of the defendant cities, the damages
would exceed $28,000 for each family of four.4 The possible devas-
tating effect of these damages becomes even more real since the
United States Supreme Court has held that there is no basis for al-
* Member of the law firm of Gill, Skokos, Simpson, Buford & Owen, P.A. in Little
Rock, Arkansas. The author is counsel for municipal defendants in a municipal antitrust
suit in the Eastern District of Arkansas.
I. The term "municipality" is used generically and is intended to encompass all local
governments including cities, villages, towns, townships, counties and other general function
units of local governments.
2. The dissenting Justices in City of Lafayette P. Louisiana Power & Light Co., noted
that "Illegal fees to defend one current antitrust suit have been estimated as at least one-half
million dollars a month." 435 U.S. 389, 441 n.3 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing N.Y.
Times, June 27, 1977, p. 41, col. 6; id., Sept. 4, 1977, sec. 3 p.5, col. 1).
3. Id. at 440, 442 n.l (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
4. Id.
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lowing federal courts to fashion a right under federal law for contri-
bution between defendants in a federal antitrust case.' To make
matters worse, municipal officials can and have been held person-
ally liable in such suits. In a recent case the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals reinstated a jury verdict of 2.1 million dollars against the
Mayor of the City of Houston. If these damages are trebled, the
Mayor is facing a personal judgment of 6.3 million dollars. A mu-
nicipality may be faced with an antitrust lawsuit for a multitude of
activities, including regulation of cable television businesses, 7 opera-
tion of electric utility systems, 8 operation of sewage treatment serv-
ices,9 provision of public water supplies,' 0 denial of a telephone
franchise," zoning,' 2 leasing of parking spaces for baseball games,' 3
regulating parking lot operators, 4 operation of a municipal air-
port,' 5 regulating on-airport car rental concessions, 16 regulation and
licensing of taxis,' 7 awarding a wrecker tow-in contract,' 8 solid
waste management, 9 the regulation of hospital facilities2 ° and the
5. Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
6. Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 700 F.2d 226 (5th Cir.), reh 'g granted,
1983-2 Trade Cases (CCH) $ 65,597 (1983).
7. E.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); Affili-
ated Capital Corp., 700 F.2d at 226.
8. E.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
9. Eg., Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983), appealfiled.
10. E.g., Community Builders v. City of Phoenix, 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981); Lockary
v. Kayfetz, 1983-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 65,594 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Schrader v. Horton, 471 F.
Supp. 1236 (W.D. Va. 1979).
11. E.g., Capital Telephone Co. v. City of Schnectady, 1983-1 Trade Cases (CCH)
65,362 (N.D.N.Y. 1983).
12. E.g., Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, - U.S.-, 103 S. Ct. 2122 (1983); see Comment, Antitrust Laws, Zoning
and Agreements to Zone Delegation of Police Powers after Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light, 25 S.D. L. REV. 316 (1980).
13. E.g., Cincinnati Riverfront Colliseum v. City of Cincinnati, 556 F.Supp. 664 (S.D.
Ohio 1983).
14. E.g., Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981).
15. E.g., Pueblo Aircraft Serv. Inc. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982). See
also Hill Aircraft & Leasing Corp. v. Fulton County, 1983-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 65,478
(N.D. Ga. 1983).
16. E.g., Greyhound Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. City of Pensacola, 676 F.2d 1380 (11th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, - U.S. - 103 S. Ct. 816 (1983).
17. E.g., Campbell v. City of Chicago, 45 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. 605 (N.D. I11.
1983); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 1983-1 Trade Cases (CCH)
65,448 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
18. E.g., Kendrick v. City Council of Augusta, 516 F.Supp. 1134 (S.D. Ga. 1981). See
also Goodner v. Bachofner, 1977-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 61,369 (Wash. 1977).
19. E.g., Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1981), vacated
and remanded in light of City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 931 (1982), aft'd, 1983-1 Trade Cases
(CCH) 65,356 (N.D. Ohio 1983); L&H Sanitation, Inc. v. Lake City Sanitation, Inc., No.
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creation of an ambulance service system.2'
The purpose of this article is to familiarize the reader with the
current status of the "state action doctrine '22 and to suggest possible
defenses to municipal antitrust suits based upon the state action
doctrine, a municipal rule of reason, and the tenth amendment to
the United States Constitution.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
In Parker v. Brown 23 the United States Supreme Court held
that the federal antitrust laws did not prohibit a state as a sovereign
from imposing certain anticompetitive restraints as an act of govern-
ment. Thus evolved the state action doctrine 24 under which it was
assumed that all governmental entities, including state agencies or
other subdivisions of a state, were, because of their status, exempt
from the antitrust laws. However, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar,25 after over thirty years of virtual silence in the area, the
Supreme Court gave the first signs of erosion of the Parker doctrine.
In Goldfarb the Court concluded that fee schedules enforced by a
state bar association were not mandated by ethical standards estab-
lished by the state supreme court and, therefore, were not immune
from antitrust attack. Goldfarb made it clear that, for the purposes
of the Parker doctrine, not every act of a state agency is that of the
B-C-82-93 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 19, 1983); Central Iowa Refuse Systems, Inc. v. Des Moines Met-
ropolitan Area Solid Waste Agency, 557 F. Supp. 131 (S.D. Iowa 1982), afJ'd, 1983-2 Trade
Cases (CCH) 65,575 (8th Cir. 1983).
20. Eg., Huron Valley Hospital, Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 466 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D. Mich.
1979), vacated and remanded, 666 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1982).
21. E.g., Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Mo.
1982), affid, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983); Springs Ambulance Service, Inc. v. City of
Rancho Mirage, 1983-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 65,646 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
22. The state action doctrine is based upon the Supreme Court's holding in Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). It has been called the Parker doctrine, the state action exemp-
tion and the state action immunity. E.g., City ofLafayette, 435 U.S. at 393 n.8 ("The word
Iexemption' is commonly used by courts as a shorthand expression for Parker's hold-
ing .. "); Sound, Inc. v. A.T.&T., 631 F.2d 1324, 1331 n.8 (8th Cir. 1980). But see City of
Boulder, 455 U.S. at 63 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (" 'state action' doctrine is not an exemp-
tion at all, but instead a matter of federal preemption."); Slater, Antitrust and Government
Action: A Formula/or Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 71, 71-72 n.4 (1974)
(terming Parker doctrine "as one of 'exemption' is really a misnomer .. "). For the pur-
poses of this article, the term "state action doctrine" is intended to encompass all of these
references.
23. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
24. Parker was not the first case imposing such a defense. In Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S.
332, 344, 345 (1904), the Court first indicated that such a defense may exist. However,
Parker is recognized as the first case enunciating the state action doctrine.
25. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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state as a sovereign. 26
One year later in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. ,27 the Court, in a
plurality opinion, found that there was no antitrust immunity when
a state agency passively accepted a public utility's tariff. In rejecting
the utility's reliance on the Parker doctrine, the Court concluded
that the state's policy on the challenged activity was neutral and
that, for this reason, the state action doctrine did not apply. The
next major decision involving the state action doctrine was Bates v.
State Bar ofArizona 28 in which the Court considered the applicabil-
ity of the antitrust laws to a ban on attorney advertising directly
imposed by the Arizona Supreme Court. In holding that the anti-
trust laws were inapplicable, the Bates Court noted that the Arizona
Supreme Court is "the ultimate body wielding the State's power
over the practice of law . . . and, thus, the restraint is 'compelled by
direction of the State acting as a sovereign.' "29
Although these cases appeared to be setting a trend for the ero-
sion of the state action doctrine, they were still only concerned with
state agencies or private parties. However, in 1978 this trend ex-
panded to include municipalities. In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Company30 the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion
written by Justice Brennan, concluded that the state action doctrine
exempted "only anticompetitive conduct engaged in as an act of
government by the State as sovereign, or, by its subdivisions, pursu-
ant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or mo-
nopoly .... ",3' Thus, for the acts of a municipality or its officers to
come under the state action doctrine, there must be evidence that
the state authorized or directed it to act as it did.32 An adequate
state mandate for anticompetitive activities of a municipality exists
when it is found that the state contemplated the kind of activity
complained of. The Court added that it is not necessary for the mu-
nicipality "to point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization
before it properly may assert a Parker defense to an antitrust suit."
33
City of Lafayette was followed two years later by California Re-
tail Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. ,34 a case in
26. Id. at 791.
27. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
28. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
29. Id. at 360 (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975)).
30. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
31. Id. at 413.
32. Id. at 414.
33. Id. at 415.
34. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
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which state regulations provided for a private price fixing arrange-
ment. In holding that the state action doctrine did not apply, the
Court held that there were two standards for antitrust immunity
under Parker v. Brown. "First, the challenged restraint must be
'.. . clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy';
second, the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the State itself."'35
Thus, with very little analysis or discussion, the Court added a sec-
ond prong to the state action exemption test-active state supervi-
sion.36 In 1982 the Supreme Court delivered its most recent opinion
dealing with the state action doctrine. In Community Communica-
tions Co. v. City of Boulder37 the Court held that an ordinance en-
acted under a city's home rule38 power does not satisfy the "clear
articulation and affirmative expression" requirement.
[P]lainly the requirement of "clear articulation and affirmative
expression" is not satisfied when the State's position is one of
mere neutrality respecting the municipal actions challenged as
anticompetitive. A State that allows its municipalities to do as
they please can hardly be said to have "contemplated" the spe-
cific anticompetitive action for which municipal liability is
sought.
39
In light of the opinions in City of Lafayette, Midcal and City of
Boulder, it is apparent that municipalities are not automatically ex-
empt from federal antitrust laws under the Parker doctrine.4" How-
ever, this does not mean that all anticompetitive activities are
subject to antitrust restraints, nor does it preclude municipal govern-
ments from providing services on a monopoly basis.4' Thus, activi-
ties which might appear anticompetitive when engaged in by private
parties may be viewed differently when adopted by local
governments.42
35. Id. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410).
36. The Court first indicated that such a requirement might be imposed in Bates, 433
U.S. at 362, but did not make it a part of the state action doctrine test until the decision in
California Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
37. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
38. Local governments having home rule power are authorized to act without first ob-
taining specific permission from state legislatures or state constitutions. See 48 MINN. L.
REV. 643, 645, 650.
39. Id. at 55.
40. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 408-09. The state action doctrine "is in the nature of
an affirmative defense" and should be pleaded as such. See Cantor, 428 U.S. 579, 600.
41. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 413, 416-17.
42. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 57 n.20; City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 417 n.48.
1983]
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III. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
A. Clearly Articulated and Affirmatively Expressed
The Court in City of Boulder held that a municipality is not
exempt from antitrust scrutiny unless it acts "in furtherance or im-
plementation of clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy .... ,,43 This does not mean that the municipality must point
to a specific, detailed legislative authorization. It need only show
that the challenged activity was clearly within the legislative intent
or that the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained
of." The Eighth Circuit has held that this requirement "is com-
prised of two elements: [1] The legislature must have authorized the
challenged activity, and [2] it must have done so with an intent to
displace competition."45 As a practical matter, the municipal anti-
trust defendant can meet the first element by relying upon applica-
ble state law, court decisions, and/or state agency action.46
Virtually any state action explicitly authorizing or, in some cases,
impliedly authorizing the challenged activity should be sufficient to
meet the "authorization" requirement. 47 The second element is met
if "the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of."
48
"In other words, a sufficient state policy to displace competition ex-
ists if the challenged restraint is a necessary or reasonable conse-
quence of engaging in the authorized activity. 49
The fact that a municipality has home rule powers should have
no impact upon a court's decision as to the applicability of the state
43. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 52.
44. Id. at 49-50 n.12 (citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Company,
532 F.2d 431, 434-35 (5th Cir. 1976)); City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415.
45. Gold Cross Ambulance, 705 F.2d at 1011 (citing City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 51-52;
City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415).
46. See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
47. Defendant municipalities should cite virtually every applicable statute and the court
decisions construing those statutes to show state authorization. See Gold Cross, 705 F.2d at
1010 n.6; Town of Hallie, 700 F.2d at 382-83; Hybud Equipment Co. v. City of Akron, 1983-
I Trade Cases (CCH) $ 65,356 at 70,121-22 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Capital Telephone Co. v. City
of Schnectady, 1983-1 Trade Cases (CCH) $ 65,362 at 70,152-153 (N.D. N.Y. 1983); Guthrie
v. Genesee County, 494 F. Supp. 950, 955-56 (W.D.N.Y. 1980); Schrader v. Horton, 471 F.
Supp. 1236, 1242 (W.D. Va. 1979). See also Deak-Perera Hawaii, Inc. v. Department of
Health, 553 F. Supp. 976, 982-84, 986-88 (D. Hawaii 1983).
48. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415; Gold Cross, 705 F.2d at 1012. P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 212.3a (Supp. 1982).
49. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415; Gold Cross, 705 F.2d at 1012. For discussion as to
what the "contemplation" requirement entails see City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415; Town of
Ha//ie, 700 F.2d at 381 nn.9 & 10; Euster v. Eagle Downs Racing Ass'n, 677 F.2d 992, 995
(3rd Cir. 1982), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 388 (1982); Rogers, Municipal Antitrust
Liability in a Federalized System, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 305, 363-66 (1980).
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action doctrine. It is only where the municipality attempts to rely
upon these home rule powers to show that its activity was "contem-
plated" by the State that the state action doctrine is not applicable.5 0
The issue to be focused upon is whether there is other state authori-
zation, independent of home rule authority, contemplating the chal-
lenged anticompetitive activity.5' State authorization and
contemplation can be found from comprehensive regulatory
schemes,52 state supreme court decisions,53 actions of state agen-
cies, 54 or even broad authority created under state law to undertake
the challenged activity.5
Although the Court has held that the test of "clear articulation
and affirmative expression" of state policy is met when the munici-
pal action is directed or authorized by the State,56 there are still a
number of lingering cases indicating that the municipal action must
be required or compelled by the state before the activity is exempt
from antitrust liability. 7 This confusion has been all but laid to rest
in light of three recent opinions by the Fifth, Seventh and Eighth
Circuits. In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire58 the Seventh Cir-
50. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 55. In such a situation, the Court has held that "the
state's position is one of mere neutrality" and can hardly be said to have been "contem-
plated." Id.
51. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
52. Eg., Gold Cross, 705 F.2d at 1011.
53. First American Title Co. v. South Dakota Land Title Assoc., 714 F.2d 1439, 1451
(8th Cir. 1983). See also Luster, 677 F.2d at 994 n.4, 996 n.6; Princeton Community Phone
Book, Inc. v. Bate, 582 F.2d 706, 717 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978); P. AREEDA
& D. TURNER, supra note 48 at § 212.2c (Supp. 1982).
54. Bates, 433 U.S. at 350; Euster, 677 F.2d at 992; Benson v. Arizona State Bd. of
Dental Examiners, 673 F.2d 272, 275 (9th Cir. 1982); Llewellyn v. Crothers, 1983-1 Trade
Cases (CCH) 65,358 at 70,135 (D. Or. 1983). But see Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791 ("fact that
State Bar is a state agency for some limited purposes does not create an antitrust
shield .. ").
55. Central Iowa Refuse Systems, 557 F. Supp. at 136 ("only feasible way in which solid
waste facilities could be acquired and constructed was through issuance of revenue bonds.").
The Eighth Circuit, in affirming the district court's opinion in Central Iowa Refuse stated:
"State authorization can perhaps be inferred from concurrent state acts evincing a policy
favoring regulation or from a delegation of authority to a municipality to act in an area
which has customarily been regulated in an anticompetitive manner. See Note, TheApplica-
tion of Antitrust Laws to MuniciualActivities, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 518, 523 (1979)." Central
Iowa Refuse Systems v. Des Moines Solid Waste, 1983-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 65,575 at
68,854 n. II(8th Cir. 1983).
56. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 57 (quoting City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 416-17 (1978)).
57. E.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Sound, Inc. v. A.T.&T.,
631 F.2d 1324, 1334-35 (8th Cir. 1980) (but see infra n.68); Springs Ambulance Service, Inc.
v. City of Rancho Mirage, 1983-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 65,646, at 69,282 (C.D. Cal. 1983);
Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1025, 1031, 1040 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Grason
Elec. Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 526 F. Supp. 276, 279 (E.D. Cal. 1981).
58. 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983).
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cuit concluded that state compulsion is not required to exempt a
municipality from antitrust liability. 9 The court discussed City of
Lafayette and City of Boulder and stated that the critical inquiry
was whether the anticompetitive conduct constituted state action.60
We hold that any municipality acting pursuant to clearly articu-
lated and affirmatively expressed state policy which evidences an
intent of the legislature to displace competition with regulation-
whether compelled, directed, authorized, or in the form of a pro-
hibition-is entitled to antitrust immunity because conduct pur-
suant to such a policy would constitute state action.61
The second decision, Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Hous-
ton,62 in reversing the district court, adopted by reference a large
portion of the district court's opinion.63 Included in that portion of
the opinion adopted was a specific holding that "[tihe state subdivi-
sion, however, need not be able 'to point to a specific detailed legis-
lative authorization. . . ." 'I The third case, Gold Cross Ambulance
v. City of Kansas Ciy,65 expressly rejected the plaintiffs claim that
the state must compel or command the municipalities' action.66 The
court cited City of Boulder, noting that it "repeated with approval
the language regarding state authorization or contemplation of the
challenged restraint used by the plurality in City of Lafay-
59. Id. at 381.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 700 F.2d 226 (5th Cir.), reh'g granted, 1983-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 65,597 (1983).
63. Id. at 237 (Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 519 F. Supp. 991, 1012-1029
(S.D. Tex. 1981)).
64. Affiliated Capital Corp., 519 F. Supp. at 1027 (quoting City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at
415). "Instead, 'an adequate state mandate for anticompetitive activities of cities ... exists
when it is found from the authority given a governmental entity to operate in a particular
area, that the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of.' " Id. (quoting
Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415 (quoting the lower court, 532 F.2d 431, 434)).
Affiliated Capital Corp. was followed less than a month later by United States v. South-
ern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 702 F.2d 532, 537 (5th Cir. 1983), which held that
compulsion should not be required of state defendants. However, relying upon Goldfarb,
421 U.S. 773, the court in Southern Motor Carriers held that the compulsion requirement is
applicable to private parties seeking to avail themselves of the defense of the state action
doctrine. 702 F.2d at 535-36, 537 n.10, 540 n.15. See also Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U.S. 579, 592 n.28 (1976) (quoting Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791); Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of
Akron, 1983-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 65,356 at 70,122 (N.D. Ohio 1983). The full extent to
which the state action doctrines may be applicable to private parties is beyond the scope of
this article.
65. 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983). The decision in Gold Cross was cited with approval
in Central Iowa Refuse Systems v. Des Moines Solid Waste, 1983-2 Trade Cases (CCH)
65,575 at 68,857 (8th Cir. 1983).
66. Id. at 1012 n.1l.
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ette .... ",67 Town of Hallie, City of Houston and Gold Cross are
but three in a long line of recent cases holding or implying that the
municipal action need not be directed or compelled by the state in
order for the municipality to be exempt from antitrust liability.68
Finally, although the state action doctrine can normally be
ruled upon as a matter of law, the Eighth Circuit has indicated that
allegations of fraud and/or illegal conduct can deprive a municipal-
ity of its protection under the state action doctrine. In Westborough
Mall v. City of Cape Girardeau69 the plaintiffs alleged that municipal
officials thwarted normal zoning procedures with regard to the de-
velopment of the plaintiffs property. In reversing the district court's
early dismissal of the case based upon the state action doctrine, the
court stated:
Even if zoning in general can be characterized as "state action,"
... a conspiracy to thwart normal zoning procedures and to di-
rectly injure the plaintiffs by illegally depriving them of their
property is not in the furtherance of any clearly articulated state
policy [citations omitted].7"
67. Id.
68. Eg., Euster, 677 F.2d at 995 ("the state need not have contemplated the precise
action complained of as long as it contemplated the kind of action to which objection was
made"); Pueblo Aircraft Service v. City of Pueblo, Colo., 679 F.2d 805, 808-10 (10th Cir.
1982); Southern Motor Carriers, 672 F.2d at 473; Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist.,
557 F.2d 580, 590-91 (7th Cir. 1977), remanded for further consideration in light of City of
Lafayette, 435 U.S. 992 (1978), aft'd as to antitrust claims, 583 F.2d 378, 379 (7th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 1983-1
Trade Cases (CCH) 65,448 at 70,557 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Llewellyn v. Crothers, 1983-1
Trades Cases (CCH) 65,358 at 70,135 (D.C.Or. 1983); Central Iowa Refuse v. Des Moines
Metropolitan Area Solid Waste Agency, 557 F. Supp. 131, 136 (S.D. Iowa 1982), aff'd 1983-
2 Trade Cases (CCH) 65,575 (8th Cir. 1983); Gold Cross, 538 F. Supp, at 963. State direc-
tion or compulsion "should not be read as an independent requirement for state action im-
munity; rather its presence or absence should serve only as strong evidence about state
intent." Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" after Lafayette, 95 HARV. L. REV.
435, 438 (1981).
Dictum in Sound, Inc., 631 F.2d 1324, seems to indicate that unless state law required
anticompetitive activity, a public utility is not exemt from antitrust liability. Id. at 1334-35.
However, a close reading of Sound, Inc., reveals that the court looked at four factors in
ruling upon whether the state action doctrine was applicable. Id. at 1344. The discussion in
Sound, Inc. as to whether the activity was required was only one of the four factors. This
discussion was only relevant to the determination of the application of the state action doc-
trine and was not dispositive. Additionally, Sound, Inc., which was decided two years
before City of Boulder, involved a private party seeking immunity under the state action
doctrine and not that of a municipality. It has previously been noted that the public/private
distinction is important with regard to the state action doctrine. See supra note 64. To the
extent that the Sound, Inc. decision may hold that a state mandate is required, this holding is
overruled sub silentio by Gold Cross.
69. 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982).
70. Id. at 746. The court cited Sound, Inc., 631 F.2d at 1334; Stauffer v. Town of Grand
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In light of the Westborough opinion, a plaintiff apparently need only
raise a facial claim of fraud or improper motive to get past an early
dismissal based upon the state action doctrine.7
In Liewelyn v. Crothers72 an Oregon district court apparently
rejected the holding in Westborough. The court specifically held
that state officials did not lose their immunity under the state action
doctrine even if it were true that their actions were motivated by bad
faith.73 The Llewellyn decision is appealing since it looks only at the
challenged activity, not the motivation behind it, and prevents fed-
eral courts from examining the subjective motivation behind the
municipal decision making process.
74
Lake, 1981-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 64,029 at 76,330 (D.C. Col. 1980); Mason City Center
Associates v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737, 741-44 (N.D. Iowa, 1979), and Guthrie
v. Genesee County, 494 F. Supp. 950, 955-58 (W.D. N.Y., 1980), in support of its holding.
71. Such a decision will conceivably allow plaintiffs with meritless cases to hold munici-
palities hostage to antitrust claims for years on end. In order to avoid years of litigation,
massive legal fees for defense, and the uncertainties of a jury trial, many cities will no doubt
be forced to capitulate to these meritless claims and settle before the time of trial. At least
one writer has suggested that, "it would seem desirable for a court, presented with conspir-
acy or abuse allegations, at least to require reasonable specificity in some initial substantiat-
ing evidence before accepting such allegations as a ground for rejecting an otherwise valid
immunity claim." Skitol, "State Action" Immunity: Government's Traditional (Now Con-
stricted) First Defense, at 26 (unpublished article prepared for use in connection with the
ABA National Institute on "Antitrust Liability of Urban, State and Local Governments").
See 44 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 801 (April 14, 1983). Such a holding would
at least lessen the chances of municipalities being held hostage to meritless antitrust suits.
As a practical matter, it may be wise for municipal defendants faced with meritless
claims of fraud or improper motive not to move for early dismissal based on the state action
doctrine. To do so would bring the case before the judge under the worst possible facts.
Instead (and unfortunately) it may be better to take early discovery measures and then move
for summary judgment based on the state action doctrine and provide supporting affidavits
and depositions demonstrating that the plaintiffs claims of fraud or illegal motive are base-
less. But see L&H Sanitation, Inc. v. Lake City Sanitation, Inc., No. B-C-82-93 (E.D. Ark.
Oct. 19, 1983).
72. 1983-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 65,358 (D.C.Or. 1983).
73. Id. at 70,139. The court added, however, that its earlier finding of active supervi-
sion was crucial to its analysis. Id. at 70,139 n. 1. If the challenged actions of the state
officials were improper, they could have been attacked under the Oregon Administrative
Procedure Act and in state courts. Id.
Because the actions of [the state officials] were not overturned in the state supervi-
sory process, "wise and efficient federalism" concerns... require the court to con-
clusively presume that, although the actions oqthe state officials] might have been
motivated by bad faith animosity against chiropractors, the actions nonetheless
represent the best interests of the state as well, and constitute state action immune
from the antitrust laws under Parker and its progeny. [citations omitted].
1d. See also Areeda, Antitrust Immunityfor "State Action" After Lafayette, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 435, 449-50, 453 (1981) (" 'Ordinary' errors or abuses in the administration of powers
conferred by the state should be left for state tribunals to control.").
74. Such a holding finds support in Euster, 677 F.2d at 997 n.7, where the court stated:
"The Supreme Court has never held that motivation is a factor in the "state action" analysis,
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If the Westborough decision is followed, it is unclear whether
all improper or erroneous municipal activities will possibly subject
the municipality to liability. In other words, will good faith activity,
even though erroneous, subject a municipality to antitrust liabil-
ity?75 One can conceivably see the antitrust laws being turned into
"good government" statutes-a purpose for which they were clearly
not intended.
Any local government abuses can be prevented by federal and
state law such as civil rights laws under § 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act, conflict of interest law, sunshine laws, public disclosure of
interest of public officials, and freedom of information laws.
More important, public interest is protected by the ballot box.76
It is doubtful that the court in Westborough intended to impose the
danger of antitrust liability on municipalities as a cure-all for all
improper or erroneous activity.77
B. Active State Supervision
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. Midcal Aluminum,
apart from the standards outlined in Mideal." See also Princeton Community Phone Book,
Inc. v. Bate, 582 F.2d 706, 717 (3rd Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978) ("the state
need not have contemplated the precise action complained of as long as it contemplated the
kind of action to which objection was made"). It should be noted that the court in
Westborough did not state whether an objective or a subjective standard should be applied.
The Supreme Court has recently held that under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 an objective standard
should be applied in determining whether the governmental official is entitled to good faith
immunity. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982).
75. The court in Llewellyn v. Crothers, 1983-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 65,358 at 70,137-
138 (D.Or. 1983) expressly held that state action protected under the Parker doctrine does
not lose its protection because it is erroneous under state law. There are a multitude of
activities in which a municipality can mistakenly participate, but which should not be con-
sidered a violation of the antitrust laws, e.g., bidding discrepancies, failure to follow estab-
lished guidelines, municipal officials meeting with clientele, etc.
76. Williamson, Commentary: The Reagan Administration's Position on Antitrust Liabil-
ity of Mun'cipalities, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 371, 378 (1983). See also Areeda,,Antitrust Immu-
nityfor "State Action" After Lafayette, 95 HARV. L. REV. 435, 449-50, 453 (1981).
77. In L&H Sanitation, Inc. v. Lake City Sanitation, Inc., No. B-C-82-93 (E.D. Ark.
Oct. 19, 1983), a case decided after this article was written, the court found that the actions
of the defendant city council members constituted state action and was therefore "exempt
from the operation of the federal antitrust laws." Slip Opinion at 7. The court made this
finding despite allegations of a "sweetheart deal" and claims of bidding irregularities. Id. at
2. Although the plaintiffs strongly argued that the decision in Westborough barred dismissal
of the antitrust claims, the court held that the state action doctrine protected the municipal
defendants from antitrust liability. Instead, the court reviewed the propriety of the chal-
lenged activity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Id. at 8. The decision in L&H Sanitation,
Inc. is compelling as it prevents the antitrust laws from being turned into "good govern-
ment" statutes, yet still provides an avenue for relief from improper governmental actions.
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Inc. ,7 a case involving California's system for wine pricing, the
Court enunciated the second leg of the two pronged test for the state
action exemption: "The policy must be 'actively supervised' by the
State itself."' 79 After the decision in Midcal it was questionable
whether a showing of active state supervision was necessary for mu-
nicipalities to be afforded protection under the state action doctrine.
Instead, many commentators argued that the Midcal formula, iLe.,
active state supervision, applied only to private anticompetitive be-
havior and not to local governments.80 This uncertainty was in-
creased following the Supreme court's opinion in City of Boulder in
which the Court stated that an ordinance enacted under Boulder's
home rule power did not satisfy the "clear articulation and affirma-
tive expression" requirement. 8' Since the ordinance failed the first
prong of the test, the Court specifically held that it did "not reach
the question whether that ordinance must or could satisfy the 'active
state supervision' test focused upon in Midcal. '82
The few post-City of Boulder decisions addressing this issue
have held that the active state supervision requirement does not ap-
ply to municipalities.83 One opinion, Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire,84 concluded that it would be unwise to require a city per-
forming a traditional municipal function (sewage collection and
transportation) to meet the high standard of active state supervi-
sion."' Town of Hallie was followed by the Eighth Circuit decision
78. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
79. Id. at 105.
80. Areeda, supra note 76, at 445 n.50, 450; Rogers, Municipal Antitrust Liability in a
Federalist System, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 305, 341. See also Yetter, Local Government Exemp-
tion from Antitrust Laws.- Community Communications Company v. City of Boulder, 56
FLA. B.J. 565, 567 (1982).
81. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 51-52 n.14.
82. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Rehnquist dissented and stated: "The Court under-
standably avoids determining whether local ordinances must satisfy the 'active state supervi-
sion' prong of the Midcal test. It would seem rather odd to require municipal ordinances to
be enforced by the State rather than the city itself." Id. at 71 n.6. Justice Rehnquist was
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor in his dissent.
83. See, e.g., Pueblo Aircraft Serv., 679 F.2d at 805; Golden State Transit Corp. v. City
of Los Angeles, 1983-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 65,448 at 70,558 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Central
Iowa Refuse, 557 F. Supp. at 137. Some courts have taken the safe route and held that,
although active state supervision is not required, if it were required it has been met. E.g.,
Gold Cross, 705 F.2d at 1015; Hybud, 1983-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 65,356 at 70,124; Capital
Telephone Co. v. City of Schnectady, 1983-1 Trade cases (CCH) $ 65,362 at 70,152
(N.D.N.Y. 1983).
84. 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983), appealfiled.
85. Id. at 384. The Town of Hallie decision is supported not only by logic, but also by
the various opinions written by the Justices on the state action doctrine. Chief Justice Bur-
ger has repeatedly distinguished between proprietary and governmental activities with re-
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in Gold Cross Ambulance v. City o/Kansas City 86 in which the Court
concluded that:
[T]he state supervision requirement is intended to control the po-
tential for abuse created by authorizing private persons to make
anticompetitive decisions and to insure that those decisions are
consistent with the clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
state policy at stake. Because municipal officials generally are
politically accountable to the citizens they represent for the deci-
sions regarding the challenged restraint, state supervision is not
as necessary to prevent abuse as in the private context.8 7
The court in Gold Cross, like the court in Town of Hallie, held that
the challenged activity in Gold Cross (provision of ambulance serv-
ice) was a traditional governmentalfunction and therefore outside the
state supervision requirement. 8 Judge Heaney, writing for the ma-
jority, specifically chose not to address "the question of whether mu-
nicipal conduct which is outside the scope of such a traditional
governmental function and which may pose a more significant
threat to competition may require active state supervision to qualify
for protection under the Parker doctrine."8 9
The question thus becomes: What is a traditional governmen-
tal function and what test does one employ to determine whether
the challenged activity is indeed a traditional governmental func-
tion? The courts in Town ofHallie and Gold Cross, either by design
or accident, borrowed the phrase "traditional governmental func-
tion" from the Supreme Court's opinion in National League of Cities
gard to the state action exemption. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 422-24 (concurring
opinion); See also City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 71 n.6 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Likewise,
the Court itself has noted that governmental activities may be treated differently on some
occasions. See supra notes 40 and 41 and accompanying text. The reason for this is readily
apparent: Municipalities are by their very nature anticompetitive at least in some aspects.
See infra note 140. Police and fire protection, sewage and waste disposal, zoning and water
treatment are all local government activities and should be afforded protection from the
antitrust laws. It is only when a municipality enters into the sphere of private enterprise that
the "active state supervision" requirement should be enforced.
86. 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983). The court rejected the district court's conclusion that
the state action doctrine also required that the challenged restraint be actively supervised by
the state. Id. at 1014. The holding of the district court that the active state supervision
requirement applied to the municipality is the only known holding of its kind in a post-City
of Boulder case.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1014 n.13. This holding was cited with approval in Central Iowa Refuse
Systems v. Des Moines Solid Waste, 1983-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 65,575 at 68,857 (8th Cir.
1983).
89. Id. Likewise, the court in Town of Haliie specifically reserved a ruling on this issue.
700 F.2d at 384 n.18.
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v. Usery.9° In that case, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the major-
ity,9 enunciated a non-exclusive list of traditional operations of
state and local governments. 92 These areas included "fire preven-
tion, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and rec-
reation.' 93 Additionally, a lower court has concluded that the Court
added public schools and hospitals to this list.94 Justice Rehnquist
noted that these are activities which states have traditionally pro-
vided for their citizens and that these activities are vital to the state's
"separate and independent existence."95 Subsequent lower court
decisions have added the following to this non-exclusive list of
traditional governmental functions: Solid waste disposal,96 opera-
tion of a municipal airport, 97 provision of ambulance service, 98 sew-
age treatment99 and public water supplies. t° The following are
included in the growing list of activities that are not considered to be
traditional governmental functions: The operation of a railroad en-
gaged in interstate commerce,'' operation of electric utility sys-
tems 0 2 and operation of a pro golf shop on a municipally owned
golf course.
0 3
90. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Subsequent to the decisions in Town of Hallie and Gold Cross,
the Eighth Circuit found that solid waste disposal is a traditional municipal activity, Central
Iowa Refuse Systems v. Des Moines Metro Solid Waste, [1983-2 CCH] Trade Cases [65,575,
at 68,857 (8th Cir. 1983), and declined to address the defendants' tenth amendment argu-
ment based upon National League ofCities. The effect of the decision in National League of
Cities upon the state action doctrine will be discussed in detail, infra. For present purposes,
however, the decision is useful in determining what is a "traditional governmental
function."
91. Justice Blackmun joined in the opinion (making it a majority opinion) with the
understanding that he viewed the opinion as adopting a balancing approach. Id. at 856.
92. Id. at 85 1.
93. Id.
94. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445, 451 (W.D.
Tex. 1983).
95. 426 U.S. at 851.
96. Central Iowa Refuse Systems v. Des Moines Solid Waste, 1983-2 Trade Cases
(CCH) 65,575 (8th Cir. 1983); Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187, 1195
(6th Cir. 1981). See also LJH Sanitation, Inc., No. B-C-82-93, Slip Opinion at 7-8.
97. Pueblo Aircraft Serv., 679 F.2d at 810-11; Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d
1033, 1034 (6th Cir. 1979). See also Deak-Perera Hawaii, Inc. v. Department of Transporta-
tion, 553 F. Supp. 976, 984 (D. Hawaii 1983).
98. Gold Cross, 705 F.2d at 1014 n.13.
99. Town of Hallie, 700 F.2d at 383-84.
100. Schrader v. Horton, 471 F. Supp. 1236, 1242 (W.D. Va. 1979), afd, 626 F.2d 1163
(4th Cir. 1980).
101. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678, 685 (1982).
102. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 424 (Burger, J., concurring).
103. Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 557 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1977), remanded
for further consideration in light of City ofLafayette, 435 U.S. 992 (1978), arid as to anti-
trust claims, 583 F.2d 378 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979).
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has provided little guidance
in determining what is a "traditional governmental function" and
has left it to the lower courts to fashion their own tests. At least one
court has correctly held that "traditional governmental functions"
does not mean only those which are "time-honored, hoary, or his-
toric."" Instead, it includes those traditional governmental func-
tions "which the public has come to expect and demand in light of
the change of times and needs of society."'' 05 InAmersbach v. City of
Cleveland"° the court noted that there were certain elements com-
mon to each of those services and activities which had been classi-
fied as traditional governmental functions.
0 7
Among these elements are: (1) the government service or activity
benefits the community as a whole and is available to the public
at little or no direct expense; (2) the service or activity is under-
taken for the purpose of public service rather than for pecuniary
gain; (3) government is the principal provider of the service or
activity; and (4) government is particularly suited to provide the
service or perform the activity because of a community wide need
for the service or activity.1
0 8
Although these elements provide a workable framework for some
traditional governmental services,1 °9 it is not flexible enough to en-
compass all situations. 0 For example, the first requirement would
appear to invalidate garbage collection, sewage treatment, water
supplies and the provision of ambulance services since the provision
of these services would not involve more than "little or no direct
expense.""' Additionally, the third and fourth requirements elimi-
nate the possibility of these services being provided by private par-
104. Alewine v. City of Council of Augusta, 505 F. Supp. 880, 889 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
105. Id.; see also Dove v. Chattanooga Area Regional Transp. Auth., 539 F. Supp. 36, 40
(ED. Tenn. 1981), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 701 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1983)
("the terms 'traditional' or 'integral' are to be given a meaning permitting expansion to meet
the changing times").
106. 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979).
107. Id. at 1037.
108. Id.
109. E.g., San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 557 F. Supp. at 453-54; Dove, 539 F.
Supp. at 39-41.
110. In Alewine v. City of Council of Augusta, 505 F. Supp. 880, 889 (S.D. Ga. 1981),
modified, 699 F.2d 1060 (11 th Cir. 1983), the court discussed theAmersbach test and refused
to strictly apply it to the transit operations of the City of Augusta: "I do not consider the
Amersbach test to be conclusive in this case, nor that it should be strictly applied in any case.
Obviously, it was correct for application to the municipal airport of Cleveland, but it need
not be strictly applied here." Id.
11. See supra note 109.
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ties under supervision by the municipality." 2  A suggested
modification of the Amersbach framework would be as follows:
(1) The government service or activity benefits the community
as a whole and is available to the public;
(2) the service or activity is undertaken for the purpose of pub-
lic service rather than for pecuniary gain;" 3
(3) government (a) is the principal provider of the service or
activity or (b) actively supervises a private party in its provision
of the service or activity; and
(4) the service or activity is such that the most practical way to
provide it is in an anticompetitive manner or on a monopoly
basis.
This framework would allow municipalities enough flexibility to
provide and expand the concept of traditional governmental serv-
ices, (e.g., airports) and meet the ever increasing needs and demands
of its citizenery." 
4
If the challenged activity is not a traditional governmental
function, or if the municipality is responsible for supervising a pri-
vate party in its provision of a government service or activity, the
question then becomes, "What is active state supervision?" Unfor-
tunately, federal courts have provided little guidance on this ques-
tion." 5 One writer has suggested that "adequate supervision" is
composed of the following elements:
The first element of adequate supervision by the state is that ulti-
mate decision making authority be effectively lodged not in pri-
vate firms, but in the state, either by adequate review or by
adequate advance specification of what private decisions are
permissible. ' 6
112. Eg., Gold Cross, 705 F.2d at 1005; Town of Halie, 700 F.2d at 376.
113. There is little judicial tolerance of anticompetitive municipal activities which are
undertaken for a profit. E.g., City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 424 (Burger, J., concurring)
("[T]he running of a business enterprise is nto an integral operation in the area of traditional
government functions"); see also Alewine, 505 F. Supp. at 889; Schrader v. Horton, 471 F.
Supp. at 1242. However, few would argue that the private party providing a governmental
service under "adequate supervision" should not be allowed a reasonable profit for his
services.
114. This framework should only be used as factors to consider in determining whether
the service or activity is a traditionally governmental service. Failure to meet one of the
factors should not necessarily result in a ruling that the activity is "non-governmental."
115. The Court in California Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97 (1980), found that the active state supervision requirement was not met since the
state had no direct control over the wine prices and did not review the reasonableness of the
prices set by wine dealers. Id. at 100, 105-06.
116. Posner, The Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust
Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 721 (1974).
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A second requirement for adequate supervision ought to be that
the regulatory process be sufficiently independent of those subject
to regulation. "7
These elements, although intended to apply to private parties,
should be sufficient to fulfill the active state supervision require-
ments enunciated in California Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. Mid-
cal Aluminum, Inc. " ' The active supervision requirement is
imposed to assure that the provider of the activity or service does
not abuse his position, but instead uses it for the purpose for which
it was intended. "19 Arguably, municipalities by their very nature are
subject to state supervision because abuse of power and improper
actions are subject to attack under state law. 20
Once the elements for adequate supervision are present, a party
should not lose its protection under the state action doctrine simply
because the supervision is defective. 12  At least one court has held
that municipalities acting pursuant to state policy should not be
made to suffer if the state fails to fulfill its supervisory responsibili-
ties. 22 Another reason that defective supervision should not de-
prive a party of its protection under the state action doctrine is that
117. Id. at 722. Posner's third element or requirement was that "the adequate supervi-
sion requirement can be met even when the state in some sense authorizes but does not
compel private action." 1d. at 725.
118. 445 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1980).
119. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. See also Miller v. Oregon Liquor Con-
trol Commission, 688 F.2d 1222, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 1982).
Unchecked private power is itself a bete noire of antitrust policy, and unsupervised
private decisionmaking [sic], loosed from the discipline of competition, is likely to
further neither the interests sought to be furthered by the antitrust laws, nor any
state interests that may weigh against those laws. Therefore, it seems reasonable to
require, as a condition of antitrust validity, that the regulation substituted by the
state for competition include an adequate measure of supervision-independent,
effective and free of conflicts of interest. This will furnish a check on private
power, and it will facilitate the vindication of antitrust interests through regulation.
Posner, supra note 115, at 720.
120. See supra notes 73 and 76 and accompanying text.
121. Llewellyn v. Crothers, 1983-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 65,358 at 70,138 (D.Or. 1983).
The court grounds its conclusion in the fact that the Sherman Act was intended to
reach conduct of private individuals or corporations-not the activities of a state.
Given this basis, the court finds it difficult to see why supervised state action that
would ordinarily be immune under Parker should lose that immunity because it is
erroneous under state law.
Llewellyn v. Crothers, 44 Antitrust Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 887, 888 (D.Or. 1983).
122. Llewellyn, 1983-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 65,358 at 70,138. Likewise, private parties
should not be held liable if a municipality, under a duty to "actively supervise," fails to do
so. If, however, the failure to supervise is brought about by the actions of the private party
(or municipality), this casts doubt upon whether the supervision was "adequate" in the first
place.
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"[i]f an erroneous state agency could lead to loss of Parker exemp-
tion, the parties aggrieved by such action would have an incentive to
keep silent or fail to institute available procedures in the state sys-
tem even though they might be successful in curing the error by
their action."'' 23 In such a situation a party, by its inaction, could
create an antitrust action when one might not otherwise exist.'
24
IV. DEFENSES
Once a court rules that a municipality is not protected under
the state action doctrine, there are still a number of defenses that a
municipality could and should raise to avoid liability or at least
limit damages. This article focuses upon and develops two such de-
fenses. The first is a municipal rule of reason which finds support
from the Court's language in City of Lafayette ' 25 and City of Boul-
der. 26 The second is based upon the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the tenth amendment in National League of Cities v.
Usery.' 2' Although only two defenses to municipal antitrust liabil-
ity are focused upon in this article, 28 the reader should be aware
that numerous other defenses are available. 29 Even if liability is
found, there are strong arguments against the imposition of dam-
ages 130 and especially against the imposition of treble damages.'
123. Id.
124. Id.
Insofar as the Parker immunity rests on federalism grounds, the existence of a
mechanism for adequate supervision should suffice to establish the exemption, re-
gardless of whether aggrieved parties take advantage of those mechanisms.
Id.
125. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
126. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
127. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
128. Plus the application of the state action doctrine as a defense.
129. For an excellent discussion of defenses based upon the conspiracy doctrine, Noerr-
Pennington, abstention and respondeat superior, see Vanderstar, Liability of Municipalities
Under the Antitrust Laws: Litigation Strategies, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 395, 401-11 (1983).
130. The court in Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 969
n.10 (W.D. Mo. 1982), aff'don other grounds, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983), held that even if
the plaintiffs were entitled to relief under the facts of the case "the City should [not] be held
liable in damages to plaintiffs." Although the court did not cite authority for its holding,
there is support for it. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 401-402; American Soc'y of
Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 561 n.2, reh'g denied, - U.S. -,
102 S.Ct. 3502 (1982) (quoting Areeda, Antitrust Immunityfor 'State Action' after Lafayette,
95 HARV. L. REV. 435, 455 (1981)); Note, Municipal Antitrust Liability: Applying City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 563, 581 (1979).
Municipal defendants being sued in their individual capacities may also raise a defense
of good faith immunity. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982); Affiliated
Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 700 F.2d 226, 237 (5th Cir. 1983); Westborough Mall v.
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Such defenses, however, are beyond the scope of this article and will
not be specifically developed.
A. Municipal Rule of Reason
After opening the doors to municipal antitrust liability, the plu-
rality in City of Lafayette went out of its way to make it clear that
not all municipal activities will necessarily be subject to antitrust
liability: "Today's decision does not threaten the legitimate exercise
of government power, nor does it preclude municipal government
from providing services on a monopoly basis." 132 In its final foot-
note, the Court indicated that it might be receptive to the develop-
ment of a municipal rule of reason: "It may be that certain activities
which might appear anticompetitive when engaged in by private
parties, take on a different complexion when adopted by a local gov-
City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733, 740 (8th Cir. 1982); Benson v. Arizona State Bd. of
Dental Examiners, 673 F.2d 272, 273 (9th Cir. 1982).
131. Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality in City of Lafayette, left open the question
of whether treble damages are recoverable against a municipality: "But those [prior] cases
do not necessarily require the conclusion that remedies appropriate to redress violations by
private corporations would be equally appropriate for municipalities; nor need we decide
any question of remedy in this case." 435 U.S. 401-402 (footnotes omitted). Any argument
that municipalities are not subject to treble damages should begin with the holding in City
of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981), in which the Court reviewed the
legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and held that municipalities are immune from puni-
tive damages under section 1983. Similarly, there is little question that treble damages have
punitive aspects. Eg., Texas Indus. Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981)
("The very idea of treble damages reveals an intent to punish past, and to deter future,
unlawful conduct"); P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, 2 ANTITRUST LAW § 311 b ("whether or not
compensatory damages ever punish, treble damages are indisputably punishment"). See
also Walker Process Equip. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 180 (1965)
(Harlan, J., concurring); Phonetele, Inc. v. A.T.&T., 664 F.2d 716, 739 n.60 (9th Cir. 1982).
But the punitive aspect is not the only reason for the imposition of treble damages.
Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 572-73 n.10, 575 (treble damages designed only in part to punish;
also designed to deter future antitrust violations and encourage private challenges to anti-
trust violations). A review of the Court's analysis in City of Newport reveals that the deci-
sion is analogizable to treble damages under the Clayton Act (codified 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1976)).
Several writers have also argued that municipalities are immune from treble damages.
Eg., Civiletti, The Fallout from Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder Pros-
pectsfor a Legislative Solution, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 379, 385-87 (1983); Note, The Applica-
tion of Antitrust Laws to MunicipalActivities, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 518, 545-47 (1979); Slater,
Antitrust and Government Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L.
REV. 71, 78 n.34 (1974). However, it will be extremely difficult for a municipality to avoid
the mandatory language of the Clayton Act, City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 440 n.30, 442-43
(Stewart and Blackmun, J.J., dissenting), and the only court squarely facing the issue to date
has held that treble damages are applicable to municipalities. Grason Elec. Co. v. Sacra-
mento Mun. Util. Dist., 526 F. Supp. 276, 281-82 (E.D. Cal. 1981).
132. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 416-17.
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ernment."'33 This footnote, which was quoted with approval by the
Court in City of Boulder, 1 4 cited as its authority a law review article
by Paul Posner.135 Posner takes "the position that, absent persua-
sive reasons to the contrary, state regulations should be invalidated
whenever it achieves results which, if privately arranged, would vio-
late antitrust laws."'' 36 He argues, however, that there are two possi-
ble justifications for upholding state regulations that thwart
competition. One of these justifications, which he labeled a "rule of
reason,"'' 37 recognizes the fact that "the difference between govern-
ment action and private action may be of critical importance in
terms of the principals and purposes of the antitrust laws."' 3 8 Thus,
by citing the Posner article it is arguable that the Court in Lafayette,
impliedly stated that a municipal rule of reason could be applied.
How the municipal rule of reason will evolve, if indeed it will,
is unclear. The traditional rule of reason test is "whether the chal-
lenged contracts or acts were unreasonably restrictive of competitive
conditions."'' 39 In short, the true test under the rule of reason is
whether the restraint promotes competition or whether it suppresses
or destroys competition. 1° A strict application of the traditional rule
of reason would be of little or no help to municipalities since
"[v]irtually any government or regulation will have an impact, how-
ever slight, on competition . , In apparent recognition of this
133. Id. at 417 n.48.
134. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 57 n.20.
135. Posner, The Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust
Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693 (1974).
136. Id. at 703.
137. Id. at 705. Despite the fact that a literal reading of section one of the Sherman Act
would declare every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade to be illegal,
the Supreme Court has long applied a rule of reason. Under the rule of reason, only con-
tracts, combinations, or conspiracies which unduly restrict competition or unduly obstruct
the course of trade are illegal. Eg., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I (1911);
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
138. Posner, supra note 134, at 705.
139. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978).
Unreasonableness under that test could be based either (1) on the nature or charac-
ter of the contracts, or (2) on surrounding circumstances giving rise to the inference
or presumption that they were intended to restrain trade and enhance prices.
Under either branch of the test, the inquiry is confined to a consideration of impact
on competitive conditions.
Id. at 690 (footnotes omitted).
140. Id. at 691.
141. Areeda, Antitrust Immunityfor "'State Action" after Lafayette, 95 HARV. L. REV.
435, 439 (1981). More often than not these actions are taken in spite of, not because of,
economic considerations. Thus, all municipal activity should not be found to have antitrust
consequences:
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fact, the Court in City of Boulder, after citing the pertinent footnote
from City of Lafayette, 142 compared the holdings in two previous
Supreme Court cases.' 43 In one the Court struck down an anticom-
petitive restraint imposed by private agreement' 44 and in the other
held that anticompetitive effect is an insufficient basis for invalidat-
ing a state law.' 45 If this same distinction is applied to municipali-
ties, then the mere fact that an ordinance may have an
anticompetitive effect cannot itself constitute a sufficient reason for
invalidating the ordinance.
146
Although the traditional rule of reason does not apply to mo-
nopolies, 147 the municipal rule of reason should apply to monopolis-
tic activities or services provided by municipalities or private parties
who are adequately supervised by the municipality. 148 Special con-
sideration should be given to traditional government services or
those necessary to protect the public health, safety and welfare
149
[MIunicipal antitrust violations should not be found if private parties could law-
fully have engaged in the same conduct. For example, a corporate official may
lawfully decide to grant an exclusive franchise, or to buy a certain product only
from one supplier; this conduct should not become unlawful merely because the
official works for a city. State statutes may require competitive bids or allocation
of business among several suppliers, but any violations of these statutes would be
remediable in state courts.
The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 284-85 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
142. 435 U.S. at 417 n.48.
143. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. 679; Exxon Corp. v. Governor of
Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
144. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 687-92.
145. Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 133.
146. Id.
147. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 689-90. Indeed, the court ex-
pressly held that "the Rule of Reason does not support a defense based on the assumption
that competition itself is unreasonable." Id. at 696.
148. See supra notes 115 to 119 and accompanying text.
149. However, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor,
dissented in City of Boulder, arguing that under Professional Engineers "an ordinance could
not be defended on the basis that its benefit to the community, in terms of traditional health,
safety, and public welfare concerns, outweigh [sic] it [sic] anticompetitive effect." City of
Boulder, 455 U.S. at 66. But see Posner, supra note 115, at 712. On the other hand, modifi-
cation of the rule of reason for municipalities "opens up a different sort of Pandora's Box."
455 U.S. at 67. Justice Rehnquist argues that such a modification would allow federal courts
"to sit as a 'superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation'" and that such review would
be "reminiscent of the Lochner era." Id. at 67-68. Such an argument ignores the Court's
comparison of the holdings in Professional Engineers and Exxon. See supra notes 141-145
and accompanying text. See also Mark Aero, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 580 F.2d
288, 289-90, 292 (8th Cir. 1978) (decision not to reopen old airport "a governmental prob-
lem, to be solved by the electorate through its proper officials"); Miller & Son Paving, Inc. v.
Wrightstown Township Civic Ass'n, 443 F. Supp. 1268, 1272 (E.D. Pa. 1978), affid, 595 F.2d
1213 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 843 (1979) (challenged activity appropriate for political
arena and outside the Sherman Act). The application of a municipal rule of reason would
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because many of these vital services are inherently monopolistic. 5 °
Very often the only economically feasible way a municipality can
provide services necessary to protect the public health, safety and
welfare is on a monopoly basis.' 5' This alone should be sufficient
justification under a municipal rule of reason.' 52 Additionally, mo-
nopoly service should be allowed for the operations of traditional
government functions if the service or activity would be best served
by monopoly service. 153
Thus, under a municipal rule of reason, anticompetitive activity
reasonably necessary to protect the public health, safety and welfare
should not subject a municipality to antitrust liability. Only non-
proprietary activities would be encompassed within such a rule and
the municipality would be required to choose the lesser restrictive
alternative. 1-4
Any discussion of a municipal rule of reason would be incom-
plete without mentioning Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Hous-
ton, 55 the only case to date applying a per se rule 56 in a municipal
antitrust case. 157 In Affiliated Capital Corp. a group of Houston bus-
not allow federal courts to question the wisdom of local legislation any more than the pres-
ent rule of reason allows federal courts to question business judgments. Instead, the court
would only decide whether the challenged activities were truly necessary and, if so, whether
there were lesser restrictive alternatives available to the municipality.
150. For example, police, fire, sewage and water are almost always provided solely by a
municipality. As such, they are monopolies. Few would argue that the provision of these
services on a monopoly basis would subject a municipality to a section two violation of the
Sherman Act. Even if the actions of the municipality did not come under the state action
doctrine, certainly it is under no danger of Sherman Act liability for such actions.
151. Eg., Central Iowa Refuse, 557 F. Supp. at 131.
152. Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579
(1976), made the following argument for a rule of reason:
I would apply, at least for now, a rule of reason taking it as a general proposition
that state-sanctioned anticompetitive activity must fall like any other if its potential
harms outweigh its benefits. This does not mean that state-sanctioned and private
activity are to be treated alike. The former is different because the fact of state
sanction figures powerfully in the calculus of harm and benefit. If, for example, the
justification for the scheme lies in the protection of health or safety, the strength of
that justification is forcefully attested to by the existence of a state enactment.
Id. at 610-11.
153. E.g., Kurek, 557 F.2d at 590-91. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 148.
155. 700 F.2d 226 (5th Cir.), reh'g granted, 1983-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 65,597 (1983).
156. "The per se doctrine labels as illegal any practice to which it applies, regardless of
the reasons for the practice and without extended inquiry as to its effects." L. SULLIVAN,
ANTITRUST 153 (1977).
157. The City of Houston was dismissed as a party with the concurrence of the plaintiff.
Affiliated Capital Corp., 700 F.2d at 237 n. 15. However, the Mayor of Houston remained in
the suit as a defendant, and a 2.1 million dollar judgment was rendered against him. Id. at
230.
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inessmen bidding on cable television franchises agreed to seek sepa-
rate parts of the city.' 8 The court assumed for the purposes of
discussion that cable television is a natural monopoly and stated
that if there was to be competition it could only be before the
franchise was granted. 59 Unfortunately, there was no such compe-
tition. The court stated that most agreements challenged under sec-
tion one of the Sherman Act 60 are analyzed under the rule of
reason.16' However, a "limited number of practices have been con-
demned by per se rules."'' 62 The court found that agreement to "cut
the pie" was "the classic horizontal territorial restraint for which the
per se rule was designed."'
' 63
The application of a per se rule in Affiliated Capital Corp. is
unfortunate. 164 Clearly, the actions of the Mayor and the Houston
businessmen were improper and would not have been protected
under the traditional rule of reason. More importantly, however,
these actions would not have been protected under a municipal rule
of reason. There were (1) less restrictive alternatives, e.g., competi-
tion bidding, (2) the activity was not necessary to protect the public
health, safety, and welfare, and (3) the private parties were not ade-
quately supervised. Instead of mechanically applying the per se
doctrine the court should have applied a municipal rule of reason to
strike down the improper actions of the defendants. 65 The per se
158. Mayor McConn had let it be known that he did not want to choose between
competing applicants. He wanted the applicants to work together, resolve any
overlaps in their territories and present him with a finished product. He abdicated
his responsibility in the franchising process to a group of powerful Houston busi-
nessmen. In turn, these businessmen became "friendly competitors" in an effort to
segment the city among themselves and prevent any outsiders from competing with
them.
Id. at 228.
159. Id. at 234.
160. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
161. 700 F.2d at 235.
162. Id. at 236. "'Among the practices which the courts have heretofore deemed to be
unlawful in and of themselves are price fixing, division of markets, group boycotts, and tying
arrangements.' Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. i, 5, .... (1958). ... Id.
at 236 n.13.
163. Id. at 236.
164. The court seemed blinded by the improper actions of the Houston businessmen and
the misfeasance (if not malfeasance) of the Mayor and failed to consider what other options
it had. The decision appears to be a classic example of "bad facts making bad law." Fortu-
nately, the Fifth Circuit has voted in favor of granting a rehearing en banc. Affiliated Capi-
tol Corp. v. City of Houston, 1983-2 Trade Cases (CCH) $ 65,597 (5th Cir. 1983).
165. See Note, The Application of Antitrust Laws to Municipal Activities, 79 COLUM. L.
REv. 518, 539 n. 159 (1979) in which the author argues that "theper se rules that have been
developed in the context of private anticompetitive conduct should not be applied to deprive
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doctrine has no place in a municipal antitrust suit since almost all
municipal activity will have an effect on competition. 166
B. Tenth Amendment
Closely related to the state action doctrine, which is based upon
our dual system of federalism, 167 is the defense that municipalities
providing traditional governmental services in an anticompetitive
fashion are protected by the tenth amendment. 68  The threshold
question regarding a tenth amendment defense to antitrust liability
is whether the state action doctrine itself is based upon the tenth
amendment. In addressing this issue, the origin of the state action
doctrine becomes more than an academic question and could effec-
tively bar a tenth amendment defense. If the state action doctrine is
grounded solely upon the tenth amendment, the constitutionality of
the application of the Sherman Act to municipalities will have al-
ready been decided by the Parker cases. However, if the state action
doctrine is grounded on some other basis, or is only partially
grounded on the tenth amendment, then a municipality should be
allowed to assert a tenth amendment defense. Unfortunately, the
courts have failed to squarely address this issue. In Kurek v. Plea-
sure Driveway and Park District 169 the court stated that "Parker an-
nounced no rule of antitrust exemption or immunity; rather, it
determined that the Sherman Act was not intended to apply in the
first place to the type of state-mandated activities there at issue."' 70
At least one writer has argued that the state action doctrine "is a
doctrine of judicial creation which is dependent upon the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Sherman Act itself." '' It would ap-
pear that the state action doctrine is based both upon statutory con-
municipal defendants of the governmental interest defense." This "governmental interest
defense" has many of the earmarks of a municipal rule of reason.
166. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
167. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 53; City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415; Parker, 317 U.S.
at 351.
168. The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the State's respectively, or
to the people."
169. 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977), remanded for further consideration in light of City of
Lafayette, 435 U.S. 992 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979).
170. 557 F.2d at 587 n.5. However, the Court both in City of Boulder and City of Lafay-
ette, repeatedly refers to the "Parker exemption."
171. Slater, Antitrust and Government Action. A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown,
69 Nw. U.L. REV. 71, 80 (1974). The author argues that the "Parker decision... is one of
non-applicability" and that "[t]o term this doctrine as one of 'exemption' is really a misno-
mer since conduct which does not violate an act hardly needs to be exempted from its opera-
tion." Id. at 72 n.4.
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struction and the tenth amendment. 72  This being the case, a
municipality should be able to assert a defense against antitrust lia-
bility relying solely upon the tenth amendment.
73
The leading case recognizing that tenth amendment protection
should be afforded municipalities is National League of Cities v.
Usery. 174 In NationalLeague of Cities, the Supreme Court held that
Congress did not have authority under the commerce clause to enact
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act (hereinafter FLSA) of
1938175 which extended its minimum wage and maximum hour pro-
visions to almost all employees of states and their political subdivi-
sion. In addressing the issue, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
Court, 1
7 6 stated that the Court must resolve whether the States' pow-
ers to determine wages paid to employees that carry out government
functions were "functions essential to separate and independent
existence . . . so that Congress [could] not abrogate the States'
otherwise plenary authority to make them."'' 77 After reviewing the
estimated impact of the FLSA legislation on state and local govern-
ments, he concluded that the Act affected the manner in which these
governmental services would be provided to its citizenry. 178 Justice
Rehnquist distinguished between the impact of the FLSA upon pri-
vate employers who must find ways to increase their gross income to
pay higher wages, and the impact upon a state, which is a coordi-
nate element in our federal system, and concluded that the FLSA
amendments interfered with traditional aspects of state
172. Comment, National League of Cities and the Parker Doctrine: The Status of State
Sovereignty Under the Commerce Clause, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 301, 314 (1980). One writer
has suggested that Parker v. Brown involved interpretation of the Sherman Act since Con-
gress had not acted specifically to prohibit state agricultural establization programs. Rogers,
MunicipalAntitrust Liability in a Federalist System, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 305, 321. If Congress
acted expressly to prohibit the stabilization program and the program "were found to be an
exercise of an 'integral' or 'traditional' government function, the Congressional enactment
would presumably give way to principles of state sovereignty, as in National League of Cit-
ies." (d.
173. The state action doctrine appears to be based partially upon general principles of
state sovereignty, Rogers, supra note 171, at 326 n.154, but is construed much more broadly
because of the Court's interpretation of the Sherman Act. Thus, reliance upon sovereign
immunity is a narrower defense, id. at 322, 329, and will necessarily involve the application
of different principles.
174. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
175. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1976 & Supp. 1981).
176. Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion; Justices Brennan, White, Stevens and
Marshall dissented; and Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration of the case.
177. 426 U.S. at 845-46.
178. Id. at 846-47. The most tangible effect of the FLSA was the increased costs that
compliance with the Act "will visit upon state and local governments, and in turn upon the




Justice Rehnquist went to great lengths to distinguish between
private employers and the governmental provision of essential serv-
ices, finding this distinction to be crucial to the validity of the Act.
For even if we accept appellee's assessments concerning the im-
pact of the amendments, their application will nonetheless signif-
icantly alter or displace the States' abilities to structure
employer/employee relationships in such areas as fire preven-
tion, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and
recreation. These activities are typical of those performed by
state and local governments in discharging their dual functions of
administering the public law and furnishing public services. In-
deed, it is functions such as these which governments are created
to provide, services such as these which the States have tradition-
ally afforded their citizens. If Congress may withdraw from the
States the authority to make those fundamental employment de-
cisions upon which their systems for performance of these func-
tions must rest, we think there would be little left of the States'
"separate and independent existence."' 8 °
The Court held that Congress did not have the authority under the
commerce clause' 8' to enact the challenged amendments because
they did not comport with the federal system. According to the
Court, the challenged amendments operated "to directly displace
the States' freedom to structure integral operations in the areas of
traditional government functions ... 82 The Court concluded
that, since local governments are political subdivisions which derive
their authority and power from their respective states, interference
with these integral governmental services provided by local govern-
ments, is likewise beyond the reach of Congress under the com-
merce clause. 8 3 Justice Blackmun, although joining the opinion of
the Court, did so with the understanding that he viewed the Court's
opinion as adopting a balancing approach and not outlawing the
exercise of federal power where the federal interest is great and state
compliance with the federal standard is essential.
i8 4
National League of Cities represents the highwater mark of mu-
nicipal protection under the tenth amendment. 85 In Hodel v. Vir-
179. Id. at 848-49.
180. Id. at 851 (citations and footnotes omitted).
181. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
182. 426 U.S. at 852.
183. Id. at 855 n.20.
184. Id. at 856.
185. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wyoming, - U.S. -, 103
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ginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association 86 the Court
interpreted National League of Cities as establishing three require-
ments before legislation enacted under the congressional commerce
power will be held invalid.
First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute regu-
lates the 'States as States.' Second, the federal regulation must
address matters that are indisputably 'attributes of state sover-
eignty.' And, third, it must be apparent that the States' compli-
ance with the federal law would directly impair their ability 'to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions.' 
87
However, even if these three requirements are met, a tenth amend-
ment challenge to congressional commerce power may still be un-
successful if the nature of the federal interest advanced justifies
State submission. 88
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wyoming 89
the Court had an opportunity to review its holding in National
League of Cities. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(hereinafter EEOC) had brought an action against the state of Wyo-
ming under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act' 90 chal-
lenging the state's policy of mandatory retirement of its game
wardens at age fifty-five. The Court cited the Hodel test' 9' and
noted that even if these three requirements are met, there are still
situations in which the nature of the federal interest advanced may
justify state submission. 92 In applying the Hodel test 193 the Court
S.Ct. 1054 (1983) (application of Age Discrimination Act to state and local governments is
valid); United Transp. Union v.Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982) (tenth amend-
ment does not prohibit application of Railway Labor Act to state owned railroad); Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act not an interference with traditional government function); United
Transp. Union v. Long Island Railroad Co., 634 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S.
678 (1982), and cases cited therein.
186. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
187. Id. at 287-88 (citations omitted). This language was cited with approval in United
Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678, 684 (1982).
188. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288 n.29.
189. - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 1054 (1983).
190. 29 U.S.C. § 621-34 (1976 and Supp. V 1981).
191. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
192. E.EO.C v. Wyoming, - U.S. at -, 103 S.Ct. at 1061.
193. The Court he'd that the first prong of the test-federal regulation of "States as
States"-was plainly met. Id. at -, 103 S.Ct. at 1061. It added, however, "that it is pre-
cisely this prong of the National League of Cities test that marks it as a specialized immunity




cited National League of Cities and concluded that the degree of
federal intrusion in this case was "sufficiently less serious than it was
in National League of Cities . ." 194 The Act simply required the
state to achieve its goals in a more individualized fashion 195 and it
did not require the state to abandon its goals or the public policy
decisions underlying them. 196 The most tangible consequence of the
intrusion of federal regulations into the states' sphere in National
League of Cities was the financial effect. 197 Since enforcement of
the Age Discrimination Act would not have a direct or obvious neg-
ative effect on state finances, the federal intrusion in this case was
less serious. 9 8 The decision in Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission v. Wyoming should not be read as a withdrawal from the
Court's earlier position in National League of Cities; it simply clari-
fies and applies the standards and tests regarding the application of
the tenth amendment to state and local governments.' 99
Although the Court has refused to expansively interpret the
holding in NationalLeague of Cities, it has still sought to maintain a
distinction between traditional governmental functions and those
performed primarily by the private sector.200 To the extent that the
federal regulation regulates a traditional government function and
endangers the state's "separate and independent existence," the reg-
ulation will only be upheld if there is a great federal interest.20'
This does not mean that a federal regulation enacted under the com-
merce clause is invalid simply because it displaces the state's exer-
cise of its police powers.20 2 The Court has squarely held that
nothing in National League of Cities compels or even hints that the
tenth amendment prohibits Congress from displacing state police
power laws regulating private conduct.2 °3
194. Id. at -, 103 S.Ct. at 1062.
195. "[T]he State may still, at the very least, assess the fitness of its game wardens and
dismiss those wardens whom it reasonably finds to be unfit." Id. at -, 103 S.Ct. at 1062.
196. Id. at-, 103 S.Ct. at 1062.
197. Id. at-, 103 S.Ct. at 1062-63.
198. Id. at-, 103 S.Ct. at 1063.
199. But see Springs Ambulance Service, Inc. v. City of Rancho Mirage, 1983-2 Trade
Cases (CCH) 65,646 at 69,286 to -287 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
200. In United Transportation Union the Court reemphasized this distinction: "Just as
the Federal Government cannot usurp traditional state functions, there is no justification for
a rule which would allow the states, by acquiring functions previously performed by the
private sector, to erode federal authority in areas traditionally subject to federal statutory
regulation." 455 U.S. at 687.
201. Id. at 686-87.
202. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 291.
203. Id. at 290-91.
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The plurality in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light
Co. 204 disregarded any application that National League of Cities
could have to its decision.20 5 Justice Burger, on the other hand, de-
voted a large portion of his concurring opinion to applying National
League of Cities to the facts of City of Lafayette, arguing that the
running of a business enterprise (electric utility system) is not a
traditional government function and thus is not exempt from anti-
trust scrutiny.z° Justice Burger's application of National League of
Cities to the state action doctrine appears to have been correct at
least to the extent that the Sherman Act, like the challenged legisla-
tion in National League of Cities, is enacted under Congress' com-
merce power.2z 7
The Court's total disregard of the possible application of the
holding in National League of Cities to the state action doctrine has
204. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. 389.
205. Id. at 430-31 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The plurality's only mention of National
League of Cities was in its rejection of an eleventh amendment immunity argument in which
it stated that its emphasis "that municipalities are 'exempt' from antitrust enforcement when
acting as state agencies implementing state policy to the same extent as the State itself,
makes it difficult to see how National League of Cities is even tangentially implicated." Id.
at 412 n.42. Curiously, this footnote was cited by the Court in Jefferson County Pharmaceu-
tical Ass'n v. Abbott Labs, - U.S. -, - n.6, 103 S.Ct. 1011, 1014 n.6 (1983), in holding that
state and local government hospitals are not exempt from the Robinson-Patman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 13-136, 21a (1976).
The availability of the eleventh amendment as a defense to municipal antitrust liability
is beyond the scope of this article. "Generally, however, eleventh amendment immunity has
not extended to counties and cities. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, [429 U.S.
274, 280], 97 S.Ct. 568, 572 (1977); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1980) (eleventh
amendment immunity does not extend to counties)." Tribe, Unraveling National League of
Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1069 n.20 (1977). See also Highfield Water Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 488 F. Supp. 1176, 1194 (D. Md. 1980). The decision in National League of Cities
has been criticized for protecting municipalities from congressional regulation under the
commerce clause based upon the tenth amendment and not explaining the appearance of
inconsistency with regard to its treatment of municipalities under the eleventh amendment.
Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National
League of Cities v. Usury, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1169-70 n.20 (1977).
206. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 422-24. Justice Stewart, who was joined by Justices
White and Rehnquist in his dissent, was also perplexed by the Court's disregard of National
League of Cities. Id. at 430-31.
207. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 605-06 (1976) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring); Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 743 n.2 (1976); Apex Ho-
siery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940); Atlantic Cleaners and Dyers v. United States,
286 U.S. 427, 434 (1932). See also Comment, National League of Cities and the Parker Doc-
trine: The Status of State Sovereignty Under the Commerce Clause, 8 FORDHAM U"B. L. J.
301, 313 (1980); Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: .4 Formula for Narrowing Parker v.
Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 71, 84-85 (1974). But see Justice Rehnquist's dissent in City of
Boulder arguing that the state action doctrine is not an exemption but a matter of "federal
preemption under the Supremacy Clause." 455 U.S. at 63.
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left the door open for lower courts to determine the extent to which
it is applicable. The court in Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Ak-
ron20 8 discussed the holding in National League of Cities and stated
that "Tenth Amendment values should not be narrowly read when
Congress has not expressly or by clear implication displaced a tradi-
tional exercise of local police power. '' 209 The court went on to hold
that solid waste management is a traditional area of local concern
supported by tenth and eleventh amendment values, 210 as such, the
court held that "plenary, governmental power to deal with such lo-
cal problems affecting the public interest should not be preempted
or displaced" by the Sherman Act.2 1
The only other decision squarely addressing the issue of the ap-
plication of the tenth amendment to municipal antitrust suits is Gold
Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas City.2 2 In that case Kansas City
officials had created an ambulance service system which allowed
only one ambulance company to operate in the city, under authority
granted to it by state law213 and the exercise of its police power.
21 4
Although the court held that the actions were protected under the
state action doctrine,215 it still chose to rule upon Kansas City's ar-
gument that the federal antitrust laws intruded on the regulation of
its own affairs and therefore violated the tenth amendment.1 6 The
court discussed the holdings in National League of Cities and Hodel
and, although neither was an antitrust case, noted that "the concept
of Tenth Amendment restraint on federal regulation can have appli-
cability when the antitrust laws infringe on the police power of a
state. 21 7 The court stated that the antitrust laws would prohibit the
208. 654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1981), remanded for further consideration in light of City of
Boulder, 455 U.S. 931, (1982), afl'd, 1983-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 65,356 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
209. Id. at 1196.
210. Id. The availability of the eleventh amendment as a defense is beyond the scope of
this article. See supra note 203.
211. Id.
212. 538 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Mo. 1982), afrd, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983). The Eighth
Circuit, however, based its affirmance on the state action doctrine and specifically did "not
address the issue of whether the plaintiffs' Sherman Act claims against [the defendants] are
barred by the tenth amendment to the United States Constitution." 705 F.2d at 1015 n.16.
Author's Note: After this article was written, the case of Springs Ambulance Service,
Inc. v. City of Rancho Mirage, 1983-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 65,646 (C.D. Cal. 1983), was
handed down. Srings Ambulance Service, Inc. held that the tenth amendment had only a
narrow application to municipal antitrust suits.
213. 538 F. Supp. at 964.
214. Id. at 967.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 967-68 and n.7. The district court cited Hybud, 654 F.2d 1187, and Jefferson
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State of Missouri and the City of Kansas City from enacting ambu-
lance service regulations necessary to protect their citizens and, in
this sense, "the antitrust laws are attempting to regulate 'states as
states' and the 'municipalities as municipalities.' "2'8 The court
went on to conclude that regulation of ambulance service is a gov-
ernmental function and an attribute of state sovereignty.2 19 Thus,
"[c]ompliance with the federal antitrust laws in this case would di-
rectly impair the ability of the State of Missouri and the City of
Kansas City to structure integral operations in their traditional gov-
ernment function of providing for the health and safety of their
citizens.
' 220
In light of the Hybud and Gold Cross decisions, it would appear
that municipal antitrust defendants not protected under the state ac-
tion doctrine may be able to successfully assert a defense that the
plaintifi's Sherman Act claims are barred by the tenth amendment.
The municipality must first demonstrate that the challenged activity
is a traditional governmental function.221 If the challenged activity
is indeed a traditional governmental function, then it must meet the
tests set out in Hode1222 in order to be protected under the tenth
amendment. Although this defense will be much more narrowly
construed than the state action defense, it may be a viable alterna-
tive when there are allegations of improper motive.223 Since there is
no requirement of actions protected under the tenth amendment be-
ing "in furtherance of a clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed state policy," improper motive should not bar an early
dismissal on this basis.
County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, 656 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 455 U.S. 999 (1982), as authority for this proposition. In Jefferson County Pharma-
ceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 1011 (1983), the Supreme Court
reversed the Fifth Circuit and held "that the sale of pharmaceutical products to state and
local government hospitals for resale in competition with private pharmacies is not exempt
from the proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman Act." Id. at -, 103 S.Ct. at 1023. This
decision is fully consistent with National League of Cities since there was no showing that
the sale of pharmaceutical products was a traditional government function and it is doubtful
that the challenged activity would have been protected under the Amersbach framework.
218. 538 F. Supp. at 968.
219. Id. at 968-69.
220. Id.
221. Id. This requirement is easily met when the challenged activity has been previously
held to be a traditional government function. See supra notes 89-112 and accompanying
text. Failing this, the challenged activity should be subjected to the test set out previously.
See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 186.
223. See supra notes 69-76, discussing Westborough Mall v . City of Cape Girardeau,
693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982).
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V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decisions in City of Lafayette and City of
Boulder have left municipalities with little guidance concerning
what activities may subject them to antitrust liability. However, this
uncertainty also provides room for the development of specialized
municipal defenses. One such defense is a municipal rule of reason
which would allow anticompetitive or even monopolistic activity
when necessary to serve the needs of the public. Another defense is
based upon the tenth amendment and its application to municipali-
ties providing traditional governmental services. Courts considering
municipal antitrust defenses should be guided by principles of fed-
eralism and the idea that municipalities are a vital part of our dual
system of sovereignty. As such, municipalities should be afforded
additional protection since they are, indeed, "different" than private
parties.
In time, the state action doctrine and defenses to municipal an-
titrust liability will become settled and municipalities will have
more guidance for their actions.224 For now, however, municipali-
ties are on the forefront of a developing body of law and must assert
new and innovative defenses when faced with claims of antitrust
violations.
224. Senator Strom Thurmond has recently introduced a bill to clarify the application of
antitrust laws to municipalities. The text of the bill is as follows:
S. 1578. A bill to clarify the application of the Federal antitrust laws to local
governments.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Local Govern-
ment Antitrust Act of 1983".
Sec. 2. The Federal antitrust laws shall not apply to any law or other action
of, or official action directed by, a city, village, town, township, county, or other
general function unit of local government in the exercise of its regulatory powers,
including but not limited to zoning, franchising, licensing, and the establishment of
monopoly public services, but excluding any activity involving the sale of goods or
services by the unit of local government in competition with private persons, where
such law or action is valid under state law, except to the extent that the Federal
antitrust laws would apply to a similar law or action of, or official action directed
by, a State. For purposes of this section, the term "Federal antitrust laws" means
the antitrust laws, as such term is defined in the first section of the Clayton Act (15
U.S.C. 12), and section 5 of the Federal Trade commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45).
Thurmond Introduces Bill to Extend Parker to Local Governmental Regulation, 45 ANTI-
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 22, 22-23 (July 7, 1983). If passed in its present form the
bill would clarify many of the issues addressed in this article, but there would still be unan-
swered questions, e.g., whether the bill applies retroactively and whether the antitrust laws
would apply to similar actions directed by a state.
